https://www.letsrun.com/news/2019/07/tactics-matter-how-ben-blankenship-beat-johnny-gregorek-to-take-home-the-final-mens-1500-world-championship-spot/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDv0kXKKmIQ
How to run the 1500 / mile- and how not to. Video analysis of men's 1500 final at 2019 USAs.
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Rojo takes a look at how 3;49 miler Johnny Gregorek finished 3rd to last at USAs. He says you get at most two moves in a 1500 and when it came time to kick Gregorek had already used his two moves. Contrast that to Ben Blankenship who was tactically brilliant.
https://www.letsrun.com/news/2019/07/tactics-matter-how-ben-blankenship-beat-johnny-gregorek-to-take-home-the-final-mens-1500-world-championship-spot/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDv0kXKKmIQ -
Excellent video; great analysis.
I would only add this minor point: As the race goes on, each curve becomes more important, particularly in a tactical race. For example, running in lane 2 on a 65-second first lap is not that big a deal, whereas running in lane 2 on a 25-second final 200 meters is a very big deal.
In any case, your analysis was spot on. I would love to see more videos like this one.
If you did a similar analysis of the women's 1500 meter race at nationals, I think you would find that Sinclaire Johnson was poorly positioned for much of the race, whereas Nikki Hiltz was in lane 1 for the duration. This made the difference. Kate Grace ran very wide on the last lap and I believe this was a major reason for her disappointing fifth place finish.
In the NCAA 5000 meters final last month, Taylor Werner of Arkansas ran in lane 2 or the outside of lane 1 for most of the race. She ended up losing to Dani Jones by just half a second. -
Rojo, I'm sorry, but this is ridiculous. It does not matter in the slightest, in a 3:4x race, where an athlete is positioned for 90% of the race. Each and every man in that race could have held the pace over the first three laps or so (62's) for at least 3000m. Swinging wide to avoid any kind of tumbling or jostling is far more productive and beneficial than trying to squeeze on to the rail to avoid taking an extra few steps per lap. Pat Casey did not budge from the rail for the entire race and (clearly) did not gain this superhuman advantage you seem to be associating with running the shortest route in a dreadfully slow tactical race. Mak and Willis both ran a decent chunk of their medal-winning runs in 2016 in lane 2 in a very similar style of race.
Trying to make sense of your video sounds almost as bad as the old geezer on NBC Sports who won't put the "drafting" behind other runners thing to rest in every race he commentates. I, weirdly enough, trust the judgement of a 3:49 miler over your attempts to sound intelligent spouting out technical calculations and suggestions. -
hmmmmmmmmmm wrote:
Rojo, I'm sorry, but this is ridiculous. It does not matter in the slightest, in a 3:4x race, where an athlete is positioned for 90% of the race. Each and every man in that race could have held the pace over the first three laps or so (62's) for at least 3000m. Swinging wide to avoid any kind of tumbling or jostling is far more productive and beneficial than trying to squeeze on to the rail to avoid taking an extra few steps per lap. Pat Casey did not budge from the rail for the entire race and (clearly) did not gain this superhuman advantage you seem to be associating with running the shortest route in a dreadfully slow tactical race. Mak and Willis both ran a decent chunk of their medal-winning runs in 2016 in lane 2 in a very similar style of race.
Trying to make sense of your video sounds almost as bad as the old geezer on NBC Sports who won't put the "drafting" behind other runners thing to rest in every race he commentates. I, weirdly enough, trust the judgement of a 3:49 miler over your attempts to sound intelligent spouting out technical calculations and suggestions.
did seem pretty over the top -
I just love listening to rojo talk, I could listen to it all day. Rojo, please start recording audio books.
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The Andrew Wheating strategy.
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He made the most of it but Blankenship definitely benefited from starting in lane 1.
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My opinion: this is a typically half-baked, slapdash attempt at "analysis" from Rojo, and not only because it is horribly written. This analysis fails to take into account the reason that Gregorek and others were running in the outside lanes, which is because the pace was so slow. When you're running 65 second 400s, you can afford to play a little fast and loose with positioning relative to the inside lane; it's not until the race really gets going that that kind of efficiency matters.
It's true that there's a lot of strategy to distance races, but by boiling "strategy" down to the one-dimensional question of lane position, this article effectively undoes its own argument; instead of proving distance races to be full of strategy and variability, it reduces them to a single, simple factor. A truly compelling analysis of strategy in distance races would take the extra step of considering lane position in the context of 1. time 2. position/talent of other athletes 3. distance covered vs. distance that remains. -
MrOpinionMan wrote:
My opinion: this is a typically half-baked, slapdash attempt at "analysis" from Rojo, and not only because it is horribly written. This analysis fails to take into account the reason that Gregorek and others were running in the outside lanes, which is because the pace was so slow. When you're running 65 second 400s, you can afford to play a little fast and loose with positioning relative to the inside lane; it's not until the race really gets going that that kind of efficiency matters.
...A truly compelling analysis of strategy in distance races would take the extra step of considering lane position in the context of 1. time 2. position/talent of other athletes 3. distance covered vs. distance that remains.
Thanks for the kind words. ;)
I did take into account the pace and talent of others. I said I would have been fine with him making a big move wide if he's just gone to the front on the 2nd lap. Instead he went wide and then went back. That was the really my biggest criticism. I focused on Ben B because they are roughly equivalent talents.
The reality also is you are wasting a lot of mental energy worrying about positioning going up and back that early. Blankenship did none of that. He just hugged the rail and did an amazing inside pass as they approached the bell and the rest was history.
I also analyzed how much extra ground he ran versus Engels but didn't make a tape of that. It was 14 meters. -
I'm all for facts, but as a matter of logic, Rojo's analysis proves nothing. We can't tell whether JG finished where he did because he ran too far by comparing him to one runner. To see whether running so far did JG in, we need to compare him to everyone, to see how far they ran.
To see the problem, just look at Centro & Engels. The race video shows clearly that they both ignored Rojo's advice. Neither of them ran on rail for the entire race. In fact, they both ran the first 800 at the outside of lane 1/inside of lane 2. Like JG, they ran quite a bit more than BB, yet they both beat BB easily.
I'm not saying that distance doesn't matter. I'm pretty sure it does. I'm only saying that distance isn't the only thing that matters. Other things, such as surging, also matter. -
[quote]MrOpinionMan wrote:
My opinion: this is a typically half-baked, slapdash attempt at "analysis" from Rojo
I respectfully disagree. I appreciated Rojo's analysis.
You are perfectly right about the issue of extra distence vs. pace. When the race is slow, a strong miler can privilege freedom of movement over ground covered and thus can afford to run wide in turns in order not to be boxed in, as the effect of covering more groud is kind of buffered by the slow speed.
However, Rojo is quite clear about this. He quotes John Kellog estimating that running wide likely cost Gregorek only half a second. The real mistake was making useless moves and spending precicus energy by going back and forth without making the moves count. This surely took a toll on Gregorek.
Possibly, he would have been beaten in every case. However, the analyis was not meant to provide unshakable proof that Gregorek could win. It was only menat to be useful and instructive, and it seems to have achieved this aim. -
I think you've got a point with the argument that Johnny G wasted some mental energy worrying about whether he's in the right spot and calculating when he should move up, head towards the rail, and similar considerations. That said, Ben might similarly have been worried about getting boxed in and he may have expended mental energy trying to be aware of who's around him or potentially coming up from behind to box him in.
I would argue that they're both professionals, keenly aware of what's going on in the pack around them, expending an equal amount of mental energy on the way the race unfolds. Then this boils down to a simple question: At their level of fitness, how much did it hurt Johnny G to hit the bell having run 1116m in 2:53 when Ben B only had to cover 1100m in the same amount of time (since they're essentially even at the bell)? I don't think it matters and I don't think your assessment of Johnny's race as a colossal tactical failure is accurate. I agree that Ben ran a smarter race, but I think you're way over the top in your criticism of Johnny's race. Bad things can happen when the pace is that slow. -
There is some truth to the analysis. But like someone else mentioned these guys can afford to run in lanes 2-3 when they are 'trotting' along at 65s. Something else to possible consider is to look at Clayton Murphy's 800m final. Tactically; he was in a pretty poor spot with 150-200 to go but was strong enough to essentially take a huge lateral step and still kick in to 2nd place..
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rojo wrote:
MrOpinionMan wrote:
My opinion: this is a typically half-baked, slapdash attempt at "analysis" from Rojo, and not only because it is horribly written. This analysis fails to take into account the reason that Gregorek and others were running in the outside lanes, which is because the pace was so slow. When you're running 65 second 400s, you can afford to play a little fast and loose with positioning relative to the inside lane; it's not until the race really gets going that that kind of efficiency matters.
...A truly compelling analysis of strategy in distance races would take the extra step of considering lane position in the context of 1. time 2. position/talent of other athletes 3. distance covered vs. distance that remains.
Thanks for the kind words. ;)
I did take into account the pace and talent of others. I said I would have been fine with him making a big move wide if he's just gone to the front on the 2nd lap. Instead he went wide and then went back. That was the really my biggest criticism. I focused on Ben B because they are roughly equivalent talents.
The reality also is you are wasting a lot of mental energy worrying about positioning going up and back that early. Blankenship did none of that. He just hugged the rail and did an amazing inside pass as they approached the bell and the rest was history.
I also analyzed how much extra ground he ran versus Engels but didn't make a tape of that. It was 14 meters.
Your analysis is more or less accurate.
A couple of more things could have come into play.
Surges will not have as much negative effect if that is how you planned you race. Example, Centro in the Olympics...
He had several surges to make sure that he was leading over the course of the race, only to slow again. The difference is that this was Centro's plan, and how he trained.
Also, Blankenship was playing a big risk vs reward game during the race.
He was basically boxed in for the entire race. He was planning on the field spreading to give him room.
Even down the final straight, he was in trouble until Yorks moved out to give him room on the inside of lane 1. -
colorunner123 wrote:
Excellent video; great analysis.
I would only add this minor point: As the race goes on, each curve becomes more important, particularly in a tactical race. For example, running in lane 2 on a 65-second first lap is not that big a deal, whereas running in lane 2 on a 25-second final 200 meters is a very big deal.
In any case, your analysis was spot on. I would love to see more videos like this one.
If you did a similar analysis of the women's 1500 meter race at nationals, I think you would find that Sinclaire Johnson was poorly positioned for much of the race, whereas Nikki Hiltz was in lane 1 for the duration. This made the difference. Kate Grace ran very wide on the last lap and I believe this was a major reason for her disappointing fifth place finish.
In the NCAA 5000 meters final last month, Taylor Werner of Arkansas ran in lane 2 or the outside of lane 1 for most of the race. She ended up losing to Dani Jones by just half a second.
Glad you liked it.
I've merged the two threads. For those of you who have just watched the video, please read the accompanying article as I acknowledge that the distance is far from the only thing that's important. The surging is really taxing.
I haven't analyzed Sinclaire's race but didn think she ran wide a lot while watching it live.
I don't think if you run wide you are screwed. If you run in the outside of lane 1 behind someone the whole race and are drafting it's not much worse than being in the lead on the rail. But big moves with extra distance is fatal. -
I liked the video too. It would be cool to have an analysis where you could see the whole pack from above, then have markers for various athletes showing how they move around in the group. Gregorek would be sort of bouncing around back and forth while other athletes would be more stable.
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You talk about what a good move avila makes yet 200m later he gives up the position he worked for and a lap later it was all for nothing. Probably what matters most are:
1) were you positioned where you want with one lap to go
2) were you positioned with 300/200/100 to go
3) did you get your position without exerting too much unnecessary energy
4) over the last lap are you positioned to move at will ( or boxed in)
Distance travelled is a by product of this. It is important but those things are more important. -
Track and field needs more of this. I ran track in high school, and run road races seriously now, and I still found the video very useful.
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MrOpinionMan wrote:
My opinion: This analysis fails to take into account the reason that Gregorek and others were running in the outside lanes, which is because the pace was so slow. When you're running 65 second 400s, you can afford to play a little fast and loose with positioning relative to the inside lane; it's not until the race really gets going that that kind of efficiency matters.
I have to agree with this contrary opinion. And add a few thoughts.
-In such a slow race staying inside can often mean chopping your stride repeatedly, another inefficiency not mentioned here.
-And great risk of going down, which in a 1500 likely means not qualifying.
-You have written elsewhere the danger of being boxed (Brazier, etc) but discount it here. Boxed when pace reaches these speeds means only placing if an opening emerges. It did for Blankenship, it did not for Cory McGee.
-When a race comes down to a crowd with 200m to go, luck and pure emotional drive factor in a lot. Josh Thompson. Never wise for the fastest to leave it late in a top-three-go-to-Worlds final in my opinion. Then it’s anyone’s race to succeed at.
-If I were coaching a (at proper fitness) 3:49 miler I would prefer the Bayer approach. Know you are top three going fast, not slow, and use that to your advantage. I think the mistake here was to wait, not lead, and to let it be tactical. But it’s the 1500. No matter what any of us say, this is how it plays out. Bayer, tho, is going to Doha. Gregoreck is not. -
Started a thread yesterday about that video, the thread was deleted. Why?
