800 dude wrote:
Avocado's Number wrote:7. I'm a bit troubled by his opinions on religious matters, both as to the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, including his concurrence in the Hobby Lobby case that went to the Supreme Court.
Hobby Lobby was a statutory case and, frankly, a very easy one. RFRA passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, and everyone knew what it meant. It was only when Christians rather than religious minorities started using it that some judges started to freak out and pretend that the statute meant something other than what it says. In a constitutional case, I would expect Gorsuch to follow Employment Division v. Smith.
I agree with most of your comments on this thread, but we perhaps differ a bit on this. The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby asserted both statutory (RFRA) and constitutional (Free Exercise Clause) claims. The district court denied injunctive relief as to both. The Tenth Circuit, acting en banc, reversed, remanding for further proceedings on the RFRA claim without reaching the merits of the constitutional claim. In doing so, however, the majority -- including Judge Gorsuch -- held that Hobby Lobby had standing as a "person" under both RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, despite the absence of governing precedent as to whether and to what extent for-profit corporations (in this case, a closely held corporation) can be "persons" under either. Judge Gorsuch, in his concurrence, went further, holding that the shareholders themselves also had standing, at least under RFRA, to assert that the ACA violated their individual rights to exercise their religion. There were a number of concurring and dissenting opinions, including one by Chief Judge Briscoe, who discussed extensively her reasons for disagreeing with the majority's holdings that Hobby Lobby was a "person" under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.
In the Supreme Court, the majority largely avoided questions about whether for-profit corporations are persons who can exercise religion for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg did not, arguing that RFRA effectively incorporated pre-Smith jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause as to the meaning of terms like "person" and "exercise of religion." So, at least among the Tenth Circuit judges and a couple of the dissenting justices, competing views about the scope of the Free Exercise Clause seemed to play an important role.
I don't know whether I would consider Hobby Lobby a "very easy case." I suspect that I would not. But it may be worth noting that, if all of the justices found it so, then we currently have four justices who found it very easy to come out one way, and four others who found it very easy to come out the other way. That, I think, would be strong grounds for cynicism about this whole process.
I expect Neil Gorsuch to be confirmed, and I expect to dislike the outcome of many of his decisions. I think I can live with that, as long as I can respect the process by which he reaches them. I didn't always feel that about his immediate predecessor on this seat.