Mary Slaney - drug cheat or not?

oldguy wrote:
In affirming, on procedural grounds, the dismissal of Slaney's lawsuit against the various governing bodies (including the USOC), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit went out of its way to note that the scientific basis for the finding of a doping violation in Slaney's case was open to serious question, and expressed the hope that better scientific standards would be developed and applied in future cases.

That is not true. Here's the opinion.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-4146

Mary Decker Slaney,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

The International Amateur Athletic Federation

and The United States Olympic Committee,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. IP-99-0502-C-D/F--S. Hugh Dillin, Judge.

Argued January 19, 2001--Decided March 27, 2001

Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Posner and Ripple,Circuit Judges.

Flaum, Chief Judge. Former Olympic runner MaryDecker Slaney ("Slaney") brought suit against theInternational Amateur Athletic Federation("IAAF") and the United States Olympic Committee("USOC") shortly after an IAAF arbitration paneldetermined that Slaney had committed a dopingoffense. Slaney's complaint raised a litany ofstate-law claims which the district court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdictionover because of the applicability of The New YorkConvention and the Amateur Sports Act.Additionally, the complaint alleged violations ofthe Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act ("RICO"), which the districtcourt dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). Slaney now appeals the district court'sdecision, arguing that: (1) the New YorkConvention does not bar adjudication of herclaims against the IAAF, (2) the Amateur SportsAct does not preempt all state-law claims by aparticipating athlete against the USOC, and (3)her complaint adequately alleges RICO violations.For the reasons stated herein, we affirm thedecision of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

In the course of her storied career, middle-distance runner Mary Decker Slaney has captureda multitude of United States and world records.She is considered by many to be one of the mostcelebrated female athletes of the past century,as well as one of the greatest runners of all-time. While Slaney began running in 1969, it wasnot until fifteen years later that she receivedinternational attention. At the 1984 Los AngelesGames, Slaney was considered a favorite to medalin the 3000 meters competition. While the worldwatched on, half-way through the race, Slaneybegan jostling for position with Zola Budd, aSouth African born, barefooted runner. When thepair became entangled, Slaney was tripped up byBudd. Slaney tumbled onto the infield, injuringher hip. As she crashed to the infield, anychance for an Olympic medal came crashing downwith her. To this day, an indelible picture ofSlaney, fallen on the side of the track andwrithing in pain, remains in the minds of manywho witnessed the event.

Slaney rebounded from her Olympic defeat andcontinued to compete, overcoming countlessinjuries. In June of 1996, she competed in the5000 and 1500 meter races in the national trialsfor the Atlanta Olympics. Following her 5000meter race, Slaney provided the USOC/1 with aurine sample which was tested for prohibitedsubstances including exogenous testosterone.Because current technology cannot detect thepresence of prohibited testosterone in the body,testing programs measure the ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone ("T/E") in thebody. This test, referred to as the T/E test,assumes that an ordinary T/E ratio in humans isone to one, and thus any ratio of above six toone is consistent with "blood doping." The ratiowas established at six to one in order to accountfor non-doping factors that might cause elevatedratios in female athletes. Factors which may influence T/E ratio include an individualchanging birth control pills, age, menstrualcycle, bacterial contamination of the urinesample, and alcohol use.

Slaney's test was conducted at the Universityof California at Los Angeles ("UCLA") Laboratory.The test revealed that Slaney's T/E ratio waselevated significantly beyond the permitted sixto one ratio./2 The laboratory notified both the USOC and the IAAF/3 of its findings. Accordingto Slaney, the USOC informed United States ofAmerica Track and Field, Inc. ("USATF")/4 of itsmandatory duty to investigate whether Slaney'sspecimen should be declared positive fortestosterone. However, it appears that the USATFplayed no such role, as the actual investigationwas conducted by the IAAF. The IAAF's investigating doctor analyzed Slaney's samples,her past test results, and two additionalsamples. Slaney claimed that her elevated levelwas the result of (1) her menstrual cycle, and(2) her changing of birth control pills.Furthermore, Slaney posited that there was noscientific validity to the hypothesis that a T/Eratio above six to one was not normal for female athletes. Nonetheless, on February 5, 1997, theIAAF adopted the investigating doctor'srecommendation and found Slaney's specimenpositive for the prohibited substancetestosterone.

As a result of the IAAF's decision, IAAF andUSOC rules required the USATF to hold a hearingto determine whether Slaney had committed adoping offense. Slaney asked the USATF CustodialBoard to dismiss her case, and also filed acomplaint with the USOC under its rules. The USOCcomplaint alleged that the USATF proceedingsagainst her violated the Amateur Sports Act as well as the USOC Constitution and By-Laws.Specifically, the complaint alleged that the useof the T/E test on female athletes had not beenscientifically validated, that the testdiscriminated against women by shifting theburden to an athlete to prove by clear andconvincing evidence that she was innocent, andthat the IAAF had failed to conduct a proper investigation.

Concerned with the dilatory nature of the USOCand the USATF proceedings, on June 10, 1997, theIAAF suspended Slaney on an interim basis. Thesuspension occurred just prior to the NationalTrack and Field Championships in Indianapolis.Furthermore, the IAAF ensured compliance with thesuspension by invoking its contamination rule,whereby anyone who competed with a suspendedathlete (in this instance Slaney) wouldthemselves be suspended. The IAAF's actionsprompted the USATF Custodial Board to suspendSlaney pending a hearing before the USATF DopingHearing Board, effectively mooting her motion todismiss the case against her.

Slaney received her hearing before the USATFDoping Hearing Board on September 14, 1997. TheHearing Board, unpersuaded by the testimony ofthe IAAF's investigating doctor, unanimouslydetermined that no doping violation had occurred.Satisfied with the USATF Hearing Board's findingthat the IAAF's rules regarding the use of theT/E ratio test were vague and inconsistent andthe six to one ratio was not scientificallyproven to be inconsistent with the normal ratioin humans, Slaney withdrew her complaint with theUSOC.

The IAAF was unsatisfied with the USATF HearingBoard's findings, and invoked arbitration of theUSATF's decision./5 Slaney and the USATF opposedarbitration, but both were represented before theIAAF Arbitral Panel ("the Tribunal"). In late January 1999, the Tribunal issued aninterlocutory decision upholding the IAAF'sinterpretation of how to adjudicate a testosterone doping offense, and found that therules were neither vague nor inconsistent. Thus,once the IAAF showed that Slaney had a T/E ratiogreater than six to one, Slaney had to come forthand show by clear and convincing evidence thatthe elevated ratio was attributable to apathological or physiological condition.Believing that it was scientifically impossible to prove by clear and convincing evidence thather high T/E ratio was due to pathological orphysiological factors, Slaney withdrew from thearbitration, followed by the USATF. Ultimately,the Tribunal ruled that Slaney had committed adoping offense.

Slaney filed suit in the District Court for theSouthern District of Indiana raising numerousstate-law contract and tort claims against boththe IAAF and the USOC. Slaney also alleged thatthe organizations had violated the RICO Act, 18U.S.C. sec. 1961 et seq. On November 5, 1999, thedistrict court entered a judgment and orderdismissing Slaney's state-law claims against theIAAF and USOC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1),and dismissing Slaney's 18 U.S.C. sec.sec.1962(c) and (d) claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). Specifically, the district court heldthat the United Nations Convention on theRecognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 9 U.S.C. sec. 201 ("New YorkConvention"), barred Slaney's claims against theIAAF, as those claims had been the subject of avalid arbitration decision. With regard toSlaney's claims against the USOC, the court heldthat the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. sec.220501 et seq., gives the USOC the exclusiveright to determine disputes over eligibility anddoes not create a private right of action.Finally, while the court held a RICO claim couldtheoretically be maintained against the USOC,Slaney's complaint did not "come close to fittingthe family of claims Congress intended the RICO statute to cover," nor did it adequately allegea violation of the RICO conspiracy provision.

Slaney now appeals the decision of the districtcourt. She contends that (1) the New YorkConvention does not bar her claims against theIAAF, (2) the Amateur Sports Act does not preemptall state-law claims made by an athlete againstthe USOC, and (3) her complaint adequatelyalleges a RICO claim against the USOC.

II. DISCUSSION

A. State-Law Claims Against the IAAF

Slaney's first contention on appeal is that thedistrict court erred in dismissing her claimsagainst the IAAF pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(1). The district court determined that theIAAF arbitration decision was covered by the NewYork Convention. As such, the district courtcould not entertain claims that would "undermineor nullify the Tribunal's decision." The courtconcluded that Slaney's present claims weresufficiently related to the subject matter of thearbitration decision so as to pose a barrier tofederal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), andfurther held that none of the New York Convention defenses towards enforcement of foreignarbitration awards applied to Slaney's situation.In her present appeal, Slaney challenges thedistrict court's decision dismissing her IAAFclaims, arguing that (1) Slaney is not subject tothe New York Convention, in that she has neveragreed-- in writing or by actions--to arbitrateall disputes with the IAAF; (2) the claims raisedin Slaney's complaint are separate and distinctfrom the matter decided by the IAAF; and (3) shehas defenses under the New York Convention thatpreclude enforcement of the IAAF arbitrationaward against her.

A district court's dismissal of a complaintunder Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is a legaldetermination which we review de novo. See Masseyv. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).According to 9 U.S.C. sec. 201, the Convention onthe Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards (New York Convention) shall beenforced in the United States courts. Article IIof the Convention speaks to the requirements ofstates that have signed on to the Convention.Specifically, the section states that "[e]achContracting State shall recognize an agreement inwriting under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differenceswhich have arisen or which may arise between themin respect of a defined legal relationship,whether contractual or not, concerning a subjectmatter capable of settlement by arbitration."Furthermore, the article requires that "[t]hecourt of a Contracting State, when seized of anaction in a matter in respect to which the parties have made an agreement within the meaningof this article, shall, at the request of one ofthe parties, refer the parties to arbitration,unless it finds that the said agreement is nulland void, inoperative or incapable of beingperformed." If an award has been rendered, thataward must be enforced unless the party againstwhom enforcement is sought presents evidence thatone of the limited defenses enumerated underArticle V of the Convention is applicable. Forpurposes of this appeal, we note that both theUnited States and Monaco are signatories to theConvention, such that the United States is boundto enforce arbitral awards validly rendered inthat country.

In analyzing the merits of Slaney's appeal, weproceed in a systematic fashion. First, we mustexamine the decision rendered by the IAAFarbitration panel and determine the specificfindings made by that Tribunal. Second, we shallexamine the state-law causes of action thatSlaney now brings against the IAAF in hercomplaint to the district court, and determine whether in fact those claims seek relitigation ofan issue determined by the arbitration. If wedetermine that adjudication of Slaney's presentclaims would necessitate a reexamination ofmatters decided by the arbitration decision, wemust resolve whether the arbitration decision,which took place on foreign soil, should berecognized by the courts, and thus deprive us of subject-matter jurisdiction over the presentclaims. Finally, assuming that we aretheoretically obligated to recognize the decisionof the Tribunal, we must inquire whether anydefense to enforcement is applicable.

1. Decision of the Tribunal

The April 25, 1999 opinion of the IAAF arbitralpanel begins by expounding on the reasoningbehind its interlocutory opinion. Setting forththe evidentiary procedure, the Tribunal notesthat the initial burden of proof rests with theIAAF to show that an athlete has a T/E ratiogreater than the 6:1 established limit. If theIAAF can do so, according to the Tribunal, theFederation has provided sufficient evidence forthe sample to be deemed positive. At that point,the burden is shifted to the athlete, who mustprove by clear and convincing evidence that theelevated T/E ratio was due to pathological or physiological conditions. In making thisanalysis, the Tribunal drew from the IAAF ruleson testing for testosterone.

With the evidentiary procedure established, theTribunal continued to consider whether Slaney hadcommitted a doping offense. The Tribunal notedthat the IAAF had established that both ofSlaney's specimens had been analyzed as havingT/E ratios significantly higher than 6:1. Thetribunal also observed that Slaney's longitudinalstudy revealed a previous T/E ratio high of 3:1;meaning that her present ratio, by the mostmodest of calculations, was more than three timesgreater than she had ever previously tested. Thusthe burden was shifted to Slaney to produce avalid explanation for the findings. The Tribunalnoted that Slaney had produced no evidence, letalone that of a clear and convincing nature, toprove that her elevated ratio was the result ofpathological or physiological factors. SinceSlaney had withdrawn from the proceedings, andrefused to tender her medical records to theTribunal, the panel was forced to conclude underthe burden-shifting procedure it had outlinedthat Slaney was guilty of a doping offense onJune 17, 1996.

2. Slaney's Present Complaint and its Relationshipto the Tribunal's Decision

Keeping in mind the orbit of the Tribunal'sdecision, we now turn to examine Slaney's presentstate-law causes of action against the IAAF.Slaney raises six such claims: breach ofcontract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty ofgood faith and fair dealing, fraud, constructivefraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Puttingaside Slaney's amorphous allegations of misrepresentations, we note that her complaintscenter around the claim that the IAAF violatedits obligations to Slaney by "using the T/E ratioas a proxy for doping in women." Thus, shealleges that the Federation failed to properlyinvestigate her urine sample. Though Slaney doesnot specify how she was damaged by theimplementation of the T/E test (for reasons thatwill become pellucid during our discussion ofSlaney's state-law claims against the USOC), theanswer is apparent. Theimplementation by theIAAF of a burden-shifting approach to provingingestion of testosterone damaged Slaney in that,as a result, she was unable to disprove that shehad committed the offense--resulting in hersuspension./6

We conclude that Slaney's present complaintseeks to address issues decided by the Tribunal.During the course of the IAAF arbitration, Slaneypresented two positions: (1) that the IAAF's T/Eratio test for determining ingestion of exogenous testosterone was invalid, and (2) that it couldnot be proven that Slaney had committed a dopingviolation. Though Slaney attempts to limit theimport of the Tribunal's decision, characterizingthat decision as merely a finding that she had aT/E ratio above 6:1, it is incontrovertible thatthe arbitration panel went further, firstupholding the T/E ratio test, and then determining that Slaney had committed a dopingoffense. As our inquiry above made transparent,Slaney's state-law claims against the IAAF seekdeliberation on the identical issues. Forexample, in order to adjudicate whether Slaney'sFifth Count (negligence against the IAAF) is avalid claim, the court would be required to delveinto whether the cause of action makes the primafacie case. That probing would require that thecourt assess whether the IAAF in fact breachedits obligations to Slaney. Slaney claims that theIAAF had a duty to properly test her for druguse. Since Slaney asserts that the IAAF breachedthis duty by employing the T/E test, the courtwould de facto be required to determine whetherthe implementation of that test constituted abreach of the duty to properly test athletes. Ofcourse, the court could not reach that decisionwithout addressing the validity of the testitself. Likewise, any examination of damageswould require an assessment of whether Slaney wasproperly found guilty of a doping offense. Thus,we accept the district court's finding thatallowing Slaney's current action would undermineor nullify the Tribunal's decision. See Rudell v.Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 928(7th Cir. 1986).

3. Application of The New York Convention

Having determined that Slaney's currentcomplaint seeks to relitigate issues previouslydetermined by the arbitration, we now turn to thecritical issue of whether we are required toacknowledge the foreign arbitration decision. Ifwe are, thenunless Slaney can present a defenseto enforcement, we cannot exercise subject-matterjurisdiction over her present claims, as that would require prohibited relitigation ofpreviously decided issues.

Slaney's primary contention in this regard isthat the arbitration between herself and the IAAFneed not be enforced by federal courts in that itdid not satisfy the requirements of the New YorkConvention. First, Slaney points out that there is no agreement in writing between her and theIAAF in which she agreed to submit her claims toarbitration. Since the New York Convention statesthat "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize anagreement in writing under which the partiesundertake to submit to arbitration all or anydifferences which . . . may arise between them inrespect of a defined legal relationship," theabsence of such an agreement would allowrelitigation of matters decided in thatarbitration. Furthermore, Slaney puts forth thateven if the Tribunal's decision is recognized,that does not influence her present case, as shewas not a party to the arbitration. The IAAFcounters that Slaney, by becoming a member of theUSATF, agreed to abide by all IAAF rules.Included within those rules is the requirementthat she arbitrate all disputes with the IAAF. Ifthe requirement of an agreement in writing isapplicable, the IAAF suggests that Slaney'swritten agreement with the IAAF satisfies therequirement. Alternatively, the IAAF posits thatthe "agreement in writing" requirement of ArticleII of the New York Convention is immaterial inthis instance, as the IAAF is not seeking toforce Slaney to arbitrate her claims, but ratherarguing that her present claims have already beendecided by an arbitration. Additionally, becausethe IAAF suggests that Slaney participated in theIAAFarbitration, she cannot now raise theprocedural defense of lack of an arbitrationagreement.

Whether Slaney's written agreement to follow therules of the USATF would satisfy the requirementof an agreement in writing for purposes ofenforcing an arbitration agreement with the IAAFis a question we need not resolve. Instead, wedirect our inquiry to whether Slaney was a partyto the IAAF arbitration, and what results flowfrom that fact. An examination of Slaney'sactions following the IAAF's submission of thematter to the Tribunal leads to only oneconclusion: Slaney was a participant in thearbitration. During the arbitration, Slaney'scounsel appeared before and presented arguments to the Tribunal. Her counsel called an expertwitness to testify on Slaney's behalf, filed a motion to dismiss, and a motion for summaryjudgment. Furthermore, Slaney's counsel moved foran interlocutory ruling regarding the burden ofproof the Tribunal would apply. Given this levelof participation, the district court was correctto reject Slaney's contention that she was merelyan interested athlete in the proceedings.

Assuming that this case had come to thedistrict court and the IAAF had sought to compelSlaney to arbitrate her claims, a determinationas to whether there had been a writing might posea barrier to the IAAF's position. However, thatis not the case. Here, an arbitration has alreadytaken place in which, as we have determined,Slaney freely participated. Thus, the fact thatSlaney suggests there is no written agreement toarbitrate, as mandated by Article II of the NewYork Convention is irrelevant. See e.g., CoutinhoCaro & Co., U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading Inc.,Nos. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 3:96CV2218 AWT, 3:96CV2219 AWT, 2000 WL 435566 at *5 n.4 (D. Conn. March 14,2000) (recognizing a difference between thesituation where a party seeks to compelarbitration and a situation in which one attemptsto set aside an arbitral award that has alreadybeen issued). What is highlighted here is thedifference between Article II of the Convention,which dictates when a court should compel parties to an arbitration, and Article V, which lists thenarrow circumstances in which an arbitrationdecision between signatories to the Conventionshould not be enforced.

We see no reason why, even in the absence of awriting, ordinary rules of contract law shouldnot apply. The Second Circuit, in Smith/EnronCogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. SmithCogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 96-97 (2dCir. 2000), cert denied 2000 WL 693555 (Oct. 2,2000), noted that non-signatories to anarbitration agreement may nevertheless be bound according to ordinary principles of contract andagency, including estoppel. Our judicial systemis not meant to provide a second bite at theapple for those who have sought adjudication oftheir disputes in other forums and are notcontent with the resolution they have received.Slaney had the opportunity to show that she hadnever agreed to arbitrate the dispute when she was notified of the arbitration, but she let thatopportunity pass. Slaney could not "sit back andallow the arbitration to go forward, and onlyafter it was all done . . . say: oh by the way,we never agreed to the arbitration clause. Thatis a tactic that the law of arbitration, with itscommitment to speed, will not tolerate."Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 140 (7th Cir. 1985). "If a partywillingly and without reservation allows an issueto be submitted to arbitration, he cannot awaitthe outcome and then later argue that thearbitrator lacked authority to decide thematter." AGCO Corp. v. Anglin, 216 F.3d 589, 593(7th Cir. 2000). Thus, we find that theTribunal's decision must be recognized by thiscourt, and unless a defense is present, must barher present claims.

4. New York Convention Defenses

Slaney alternatively suggests that even if weare to determine that she is bound by thearbitration panel's decision, the New YorkConvention provides exceptions in which a courtneed not enforce a foreign arbitral decision, andthat those defenses to enforcement are applicableto the Tribunal's decision.

The first such defense raised by Slaney is thatthe Tribunal's decision should not be enforcedbecause she was denied the opportunity to presenther case. Slaney contends that under the IAAFrules, the IAAF has the burden of proving beyonda reasonable doubt that a doping offense hasoccurred. Her defense, she puts forth, was thatthe IAAF could not scientifically prove beyond areasonable doubt that any prohibited substancewas in her urine. Thus, when the Tribunalconcluded it was bound by the IAAF's position--that upon a showing that an athlete had a T/Eratio greater than 6:1 the burden shifted to theathlete to show by clear and convincing evidencethat the elevated ratio was due to a pathologicalor physiological condition--the Tribunal ineffect denied Slaney a meaningful opportunity topresent her case.

Article V(1)(b) of the New York Conventionstates that recognition and enforcement of anaward may be refused if the party against whom itis invoked furnishes proof that it "was not givenproper notice of the appointment of thearbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings orwas otherwise unable to present his case."(emphasis added). A court of appeals reviews a district court's decision confirming anarbitration award under ordinary standards:accepting findings of fact that are not clearlyerroneous and deciding questions of law de novo.See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514U.S. 938, 947-48, (1995); Generica Ltd. v.Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129(7th Cir. 1997). As we have noted, in order tocomport with the requirement that a party to aforeign arbitration be able to present her case,we require that the arbitrator provide afundamentally fair hearing. See Generica, 125F.3d at 1130. A fundamentally fair hearing is onethat "meets the minimal requirements of fairness--adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, andan impartial decision by the arbitrator."Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) (internalcitation omitted). Nevertheless, parties that have chosen to remedy their disputes througharbitration rather than litigation should notexpect the same procedures they would find in thejudicial arena. See Generica, 125 F.3d at 1130.Specifically, concerning evidentiary matters, theSupreme Court has noted that "[a]rbitrators arenot bound by the rules of evidence." Bernhardt v.Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 n. 4,(1956). The extent of an arbitrator's latitude issuch that an "arbitrator is not bound to hear allof the evidence tendered by the parties. . . .[H]e must [merely] give each of the parties tothe dispute an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and arguments." Generica, 125 F.3dat 1130 (citing Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union DeTronquistas, 763 F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1985)). Itis when the exclusion of relevant evidenceactually deprived a party of a fair hearing thatit is appropriate to vacate an arbitral award.See id.

In Generica, we surveyed several cases in whichan arbitrator's award was not enforced by thecourts on the grounds raised now by Slaney. Forexample, in Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc.,120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997), the court heldthat, under the FAA sec. 10(a), an arbitrationpanel's refusal to continue hearings to allow awitness to testify, the only witness withevidence of fraud not found from other sources,was fundamental unfairness and misconductsufficient to vacate the award. In Iran AircraftIndus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir.1992), a court also vacated an arbitration award,in that instance because the tribunal changedevidentiary rules during the hearing and thusprevented a party from presenting its documentaryevidence. See also Hoteles Condado, 763 F.2d at40.) (vacating award when the arbitrator excludedthe only evidence available to refute theclaims); Hall v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 511F.2d 663, 664 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing toenforce an award because the arbitration boardrefused to give weight to a party's previouslyuntendered alibi defense). Our examination ofthese cases leads us to conclude that Slaney'sallegation has no merit. This defense toenforcement of a foreign arbitration need notapply when a panel employs a burden-shifting testin a fair manner. Slaney was not denied anopportunity to present her evidence. Rather, thearbitrator's decision merely maintained the samestandard of proof the IAAF had always been guidedby. As such, Slaney's complaint does not trulyattack the procedure implemented by thearbitration panel, but rather an underlying evidentiary decision of the panel. Unfortunatelyfor Slaney, as the Supreme Court has noted,arbitrators are not bound by the rules ofevidence. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203-04 n.4.Thus, this attempted defense must fail.

Slaney's final submission on this issue is that"presuming she had committed a doping offensebased on a test that is scientifically invalidand discriminatory towards female athletesviolated the 'most basic notions of morality andjustice.'" Slaney further postulates that"eliminating the presumption of [her] innocencebased upon her elevated T/E ratio also violates . . . explicit public policy that is well definedand dominant and is ascertained by reference tothe laws and legal precedents and not fromgeneral considerations of supposed publicinterests."

According to Article V(2)(b) of the New YorkConvention, "[r]ecognition and enforcement of anarbitral award may also be refused if thecompetent authority in the country whererecognition and enforcement is sought finds that:. . . [t]he recognition or enforcement of theaward would be contrary to the public policy ofthat country." In Fotocrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975), the SecondCircuit noted that the public policy defense isexceedingly narrow. While Slaney states that theTribunal's decision meets the stringentrequirements of that case and others, in that theTribunal's decision violated the "most basicnotions of morality and justice," id., and thatenforcement would entail a violation of a paramount legal principle that is "ascertained byreference to the laws and legal precedents andfrom general considerations of supposed publicinterests," Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.Gutenhoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445(11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted),she provides little support for her contention.

Reduced to its essence, Slaney contends thatthe burden-shifting approach adopted by the IAAFviolates United States public policy. Wedisagree. According to the parties, proving thepresence of exogenous testosterone in the body byscientific tests is not possible at the presenttime. Therefore, the IAAF has adopted therebuttable presumption of ingestion from a high T/E ratio in an athlete's urine, as detailedthroughout this opinion. Were the IAAF not tomake use of the rebuttable presumption, it wouldbe nearly impossible, absent eyewitness proof, toever find that an athlete had ingested testosterone. As the IAAF notes, criminaldefendants are frequently required to comeforward with proof establishing a basis forasserting affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Martinv. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Leland v. Oregon,343 U.S. 790 (1952). We hope that at somejuncture, science will develop a means fordetecting exogenous testosterone in athletes,such that an athlete's T/E ratio of 11.6:1 can bediscounted if it is based on innocent factors.However, until that point in time, we are confident that requiring an athlete to prove byclear and convincing evidence that her elevatedratio was due to pathological or physiologicalfactors does not invoke a violation of UnitedStates public policy as federal case law hasrequired in order for a court to refuse toenforce a foreign arbitral award.

Thus, having found that (1) Slaney participated in the IAAF arbitration, (2) her present state-law complaint seeks to relitigate issues decided by the IAAF Tribunal, (3) the New York Convention mandates enforcement of the arbitrator's decision, and (4) there is no defense that should bar enforcement of the arbitration decision, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Slaney's state-law claims against the IAAF pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

B. State-Law Claims Against the USOC

Much as it does against the IAAF, Slaney's complaint alleges state-law violations against the USOC. And, much like it did with regard to the state-law claims against the IAAF, the district court dismissed Slaney's state-law claims against the USOC, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The district court granted USOC's motion to dismiss after determining that the Amateur Sports Act preempted Slaney's state-law claims against the Committee, and that the Act did not provide for a private right of action under which Slaney could seek to have those claims addressed by the district court. Slaney challenges the decision of the district court, arguing that the preemption doctrine does not apply in this arena, such that the Amateur Sports Act poses no jurisdictional barrier to the adjudication of Slaney's state-law claims against the USOC. Once again, we review a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) de novo. See Massey, 221 F.3d at 1034.

We begin by noting that Slaney does not challenge the district court's statement that the Amateur Sports Act creates no private right of action. In fact, Slaney seeks to distance her case from those in which plaintiffs have attempted to bring suit under the Act. As stated in her appellate brief, "[n]or is Mrs. Slaney seeking to pursue a claim under the Amateur Sports Act. In many of the cases cited by the District Court, the plaintiffs asserted an implied right in the Amateur Sports Act to bring an action [to] enforce the USOC's obligations under the Act. Martinez v. USOC, 802 F.2d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1987); Michels v. United States Olympic Committee, 741 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1984); Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1985); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980). Mrs. Slaney does not dispute the results in those cases; they are simply irrelevant." Thus, we concentrate our inquiry on the issue of whether the Amateur Sports Act precludes the court from examining Slaney's state-law claims.

According to the Amateur Sports Act, one of the purposes of the USOC is to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games. See 36 U.S.C. sec. 220503(3). The Act also states that the USOC is designed "to provide swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations," and "to encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for women." Id. at sec.sec. 220503(8), 220503(12).

Beginning with the often quoted language from the concurrence in Michels v. United States Olympic Committee, the district court reiterated that "there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games." 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring). From there, the court cited numerous cases which have adopted the principle that eligibility decisions fall within the USOC's exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games. For example, in Dolan v. United States Equestrian Team, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314, 608 A.2d 434, 437 (App. Div. 1992), the court focused on the need for uniformity in determining questions of eligibility, and held "that it would be inappropriate to attribute different or unique meanings to [the Amateur Sports Act's] provisions in New Jersey and thus create a jurisdictional sanctuary from the Congressional determination that these types of disputes should be resolved outside the judicial processes." Similarly, in Walton-Floyd v. United States Olympic Committee, 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), the court noted that "[t]he interest of maintaining consistent interpretations among jurisdictions requires the Act to pre-empt claims asserted under state tort law. To hold a common law duty exists outside the scope of the Act, thereby enabling an individual athlete to bring suit, threatens to override legislative intent and opens the door to inconsistent interpretations of the Act." We agree with the district court and the courts in Dolan and Walton-Floyd that strict questions of athletes' eligibility are preempted by the Amateur Sports Act's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the USOC over all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games. However, that conclusion does not end our analysis.

Despite the fact that the district court specifically noted its ruling was not based on a finding that the Amateur Sports Act was a complete preemption to all state-law claims, Slaney devotes an ample portion of her brief to arguing that the complete preemption doctrine should not be applied in this context. There is no disagreement that state-law causes of action can be brought against the USOC. However, when it comes to challenging the eligibility determination of the USOC, only a very specific claim will avoid the impediment to subject matter jurisdiction that sec. 220503(3) poses.

In Foschi v. United States Swimming Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)--a case relied upon by Slaney for the proposition that the Amateur Sports Act does not create complete preemption-- the court addressed issues of federal jurisdiction in the context of state-law claims against the USOC, and other amateur athletic organizations. While the district court did not dismiss those claims as being preempted by the Amateur Sports Act, that decision can be understood by examining the claims alleged. There, the plaintiff alleged that her contractual due process right was violated when United States Swimming, among other things, contravened its own rules. See id. at 237. While there is no dispute that the USOC has exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to eligibility determinations, the courts can still play a role in ensuring that the organization follows its rules for determining eligibility. The extent of the courts' powers in this area was previously examined by way of a suit brought by an athlete who captured the world's attention for reasons other than her competitive achievements. In Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Or. 1994) vacated on other grounds, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995), the court defined (we believe correctly) the limited role that federal courts should play in eligibility determinations. There, the court cautioned that "courts should rightly hesitate before intervening in disciplinary hearings held by private associations . . . . Intervention is appropriate only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the association has clearly breached its own rules, that breach will imminently result in serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies." Yet, while carving out this limited exception to the preemption created by the Amateur Sports Act, the opinion forewarned that while examining whether internal rules had been complied with, the courts "should not intervene in the merits of the underlying dispute." Id.

With this understanding of the limits of preemption, we turn to Slaney's claims against the USOC. Slaney suggests that nothing in the Act precludes her from bringing her state-law claims regarding the USOC's administration of its drug testing program, and specifically "the unlawful manner in which the USOC conducts its doping program." Based on our analysis above, we disagree. An inspection of the state-law claims that Slaney brings against the USOC reveals that, despite her best efforts to suggest to the contrary, Slaney is challenging the method by which the USOC determines eligibility of its athletes. Slaney's first state-law cause of action against the USOC is a breach of contract claim. Slaney suggests that the USOC violated its contractual obligations to Slaney by which she suffered damages. While Slaney attempts to skirt the issue, what she is actually alleging is that she was injured by the USOC's determination that she was ineligible to compete. Similarly, Slaney's negligence claim against the USOC posits that the USOC breached a duty to Slaney by using the T/E ratio as a proxy for doping, and that as a result Slaney was damaged. Slaney's other state-law claims are no different. Examination of any of those claims would require an Article III court to examine as an underlying issue the validity of the T/E test, an endeavor we cannot partake in.

We note that throughout her complaint Slaney attempts to avoid any mention of the fact that her damages arise from the USOC's determination regarding her eligibility. We assume that such a tactic is a recognition of what we have already

stated: the USOC has exclusive jurisdiction, under the Amateur Sports Act, to determine all matters pertaining to eligibility of athletes. Yet, Slaney cannot escape the fact that her state-law claims, whether framed as breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, or negligent misrepresentation, are actually challenges to the method by which the USOC determines eligibility of athletes. Slaney does not suggest that the organization contravened its own guidelines, and as Slaney freely admits, the Amateur Sports Act creates no private cause of action. Thus, the district court was correct in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Slaney's

state-law claims against the USOC and thus in dismissing those causes of action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

C. RICO Claims

Slaney's final contention on appeal is that the district court erred in dismissing her RICO claims against the USOC./7 In her complaint, Slaney alleges that the USOC conducted and continues to conduct the drug testing affairs of

the "Olympic Movement" through a pattern of racketeering activity. Slaney puts forth that the Olympic Movement is the principal international association of sports organizations and persons. The Movement, which she posits operates under the

supreme authority of the International Olympic Committee ("IOC"), is comprised of the international federations, national Olympic committees, organizing committees of the Olympic games, national associations, clubs and the athletes. According to the complaint, the Movement's drug testing program "is a fraud, designed in principal if not exclusive part to protect the commercial value of the Olympic and subsidiary organizations' properties and their product." The district court, relying in part on our decision in Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225 (7th Cir. 1997), determined that Slaney's claim against the USOC "does not come close to fitting the family of claims Congress intended the RICO statute to cover." Thus, the court dismissed Slaney's 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962(c) claim. The court also held that Slaney had failed to allege a violation of the RICO conspiracy provision, and that hence she had failed to state a proper claim under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962(d).

We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo, and accept all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See

Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). However, the court is not required to ignore facts alleged in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim. See Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1993). In evaluating the dismissal of Slaney's complaint, we examine the complaint as a whole and will affirm the district court's order of dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that Slaney can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. See Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales, Inc., 155 F.3d 927, 930 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Furthermore, allegations of fraud in a civil RICO complaint are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to plead all averments of fraud with

particularity. See Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a RICO plaintiff must, at a minimum, describe the two predicate acts of fraud with some specificity and state the time, place, and content of the alleged false representations, the method by which the misrepresentations were communicated, and the identities of the parties to those misrepresentations. See id. at 726, 728- 29; see also, Lachmund v. ADM Investor Serv., Inc., 191 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, an appellate court may affirm the district court's dismissal on any ground supported by the record, even if different from the grounds relied upon by the district court. See Triad Ass'n v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 594 (7th Cir. 1989).

1. Sufficiency of Allegations Under sec. 1962(c)

In order to state a viable cause of action under sec. 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496

(1985)./8 Taking the facts alleged in Slaney's complaint as true (without vouching for their truth), the USOC is the domestic representative or agent of the IOC and is responsible for carrying out the mission of the IOC and the Olympic Movement. The USOC is subject to the IOC's drug testing program, which it carries out in the United States, and is a member of the Olympic Movement. Finally, the Olympic Movement is subject to the supreme authority of the IOC. Thus, Slaney posits, the USOC are "persons" associated with the "enterprise" that is the Olympic Movement.

Slaney's RICO claim against the USOC is legally insufficient for a number of reasons. As the district court did, we will first examine whether Slaney's complaint satisfies the conduct prong of a 1962(c) cause of action./9 According to the Supreme Court, in order to have conducted or participated in the enterprise's affairs under sec. 1962(c), the person charged must have had some part in directing those affairs. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). "In other words, she must have participated in the operation or the management of the enterprise itself, and she must have asserted some control over the enterprise." United States v. Swan, 224 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2000). Slaney suggests that because the USOC is responsible for administering the drug testing program in the United States, that the USOC conducts the affairs of the enterprise. While Slaney is correct that sec. 1962(c) does not require the individual (here, the USOC) to have absolute domination over the enterprise (in this instance, the Olympic Movement), RICO does require that the person have had some control over the enterprise itself. See Swan, 224 F.3d at 635.

Slaney's complaint fails to allege that the USOC exerts any control over the Olympic Movement. In fact, Slaney's description of the Olympic Movement suggests a structure in which the USOC could not have directed the enterprise's

affairs. The complaint suggests the Movement as operating "under the supreme authority of the IOC" which has sole responsibility for allowing members into the Movement. The USOC is described as merely a "domestic representative or agent .. . responsible for carrying out the mission of the IOC." The complaint is devoid of any suggestion that as an agent, the USOC took part in managing the Movement.

At best, Slaney has alleged that the USOC has been delegated the authority by the Movement to conduct the drug testing program in the United States. However, as we have made patent, "simply performing services for an enterprise, even with knowledge of the enterprise's illicit nature, is not enough to submit an individual to RICO liability under sec. 1962(c)." Goren, 156 F.3d at 728. Rather, we require that "the defendant must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise." Id. at 727. Slaney's complaint contains no allegation that the USOC, as an individual, had any control over the enterprise itself. While Slaney suggests such lack of control is "besides the point," the Supreme Court has held to the contrary. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179. We cannot draw the conclusion that USOC's control over one aspect of the Olympic Movement's activities in this country translates into the USOC having had control over the Movement as an

enterprise. Simple exertion of control over one aspect of an enterprise's activities does not evince control over the enterprise itself.

Even if Slaney's complaint could be read to allege that the USOC took some part in directing the Olympic Movement's affairs, it fails (as the district court noted) to satisfy the pattern requirement of 1962(c) because it fails to plead

sufficient facts to show that the USOC engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. As stated above, a pattern of racketeering activity consists, at a minimum, of two predicate acts of racketeering (committed within a ten-year time

period). See Goren, 156 F.3d at 728. Here, Slaney advances the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. sec.sec. 1341, 1343. As we noted earlier, a plaintiff alleging predicate acts of mail and wire fraud must do so with

particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). In order to satisfy this standard, a RICO plaintiff must allege the identity of the person who made the representation, the time, place and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff. See Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, because a RICO plaintiff must allege two predicate acts of fraud, she must satisfy the

requirements of Rule 9(b) twice. See Emery v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1998).

After examining Slaney's complaint, we find that she has failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Slaney's complaint asserts that the USOC "used and continues to use the mails and wires to convey their false and deceptive communications to and about Mrs. Slaney, which communications were and continue to be an integral component of the fraudulent scheme." To satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), Slaney suggests that we examine paragraphs 1-104 of her complaint./10 A perusal of the complaint convinces this Court that Slaney has not alleged two predicate acts. According to Slaney, the USOC informed the USATF that it was mandatory for the USATF to conduct an investigation of Slaney's urine sample before she could be declared positive for prohibited testosterone. Slaney suggests that this information was first transmitted to the USATF on June 28, 1996 and then again two weeks later. As such, Slaney suggests that we find that the pattern requirement of RICO has been satisfied.

Slaney has not presented any case law, nor have we found any precedent for the proposition that a single fraudulent representation, reiterated once over a two-week period can constitute a pattern of racketeering for 1962(c) purposes. In

Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986), we held that a single fraudulent scheme with only one injury to one victim was not a "pattern of racketeering activity" under sec. 1962(c) simply because it required several acts of mail and wire fraud to inflict the single injury. In so holding, we noted that mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique among the various sorts of "racketeering activity" possible under RICO in that the existence of a multiplicity of predicate acts may be no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying fraudulent activity. Thus, a multiplicity of mailings does not necessarily translate into a "pattern" of racketeering activity. See Lipin, 803 F.2d at 325; see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1989); Tellis v. United States

Fidelity & Guar. Co., 826 F.2d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 1986) (multiple acts of mail fraud in furtherance of a single episode of fraud involving one victim and relating to one basic transaction cannot constitute the necessary pattern). Nor is the

fact that Slaney suggests the USOC continues to conduct the drug testing program in the United States sufficient to plead the pattern requirement. "Indeed, we have repeatedly held that a plaintiff's conclusory allegations that 'defendants' also defrauded unidentified 'others' are not enough to plead the requisite pattern of fraud." Goren, 156 F.3d at 729. Because the single representation that the USATF would conduct the investigation into Slaney's urine sample is the only fraud alleged in the complaint, that complaint fails to state a claim under sec. 1962(c). Thus, the district court was correct when it noted that Slaney's claim does not come close to fitting the family of claims Congress intended the RICO statute to cover./11

2. Sufficiency of Allegations Under sec. 1962(d)

We have long recognized that sec. 1962(d)'s target, like that of all provisions prohibiting conspiracies, is the agreement to violate RICO's substantive provisions, not the actual violations themselves. See Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1992)./12 Accordingly, it is the well-established law of this Circuit that an individual can be charged under sec. 1962(d) even if he personally does not agree to commit two predicate acts of

racketeering. See Goren, 156 F.3d at 731. "[T]he touchstone of liability under sec. 1962(d) is an agreement to participate in an endeavor which, if completed, would constitute a violation of the substantive statute." Id. at 732. Hence, in order

to state a viable claim for conspiracy under sec. 1962(d), a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant agreed to maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering activity, and (2) the defendant further agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish those goals. Lachmund, 191 F.3d at 784.

Slaney's complaint did not allege a violation of the RICO conspiracy statute. Nonetheless, the district court was correct to address whether there had been a violation of that section of RICO. The fact that a complaint does not

reference 1962(d) is no obstacle to our consideration of whether Slaney's complaint states a claim under sec. 1962(d) because under the notice pleading regime of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories. See Goren, 156 F.3d at 730 n.8. "Instead of asking whether the complaint points to the appropriate statute, a court should ask whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with

the allegations." Bartholet v. Reishauser A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992).

Slaney's complaint is wanting for any allegation that the USOC agreed to violate RICO. As the district court noted, the closest the complaint comes to alleging any sort of agreement is in the statement that the USOC ordered the UCLA

laboratory not to hand over to Slaney any information regarding the laboratory's analysis of her specimen. Yet, as the court noted, there is not even a hint that this command by the USOC was given with any motivation to participate in the fraudulent affairs of the Olympic Movement or an agreement to commit two predicate acts. Thus, Slaney results to bolstering her 1962(d) claim by introducing new evidence and drawing inferences from those materials that the USOC is engaging in a conspiracy to violate RICO. We have consistently frowned upon such essays to cure pleading deficiencies by means of introducing new factual support in appellate briefs. Put simply, "the pleading itself must state the essential

elements of the RICO action or it is worthy of dismissal." Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 646 (1995). As a result, we find that Slaney has failed to sufficiently allege a RICO conspiracy.

III. CONCLUSION

Slaney participated in a valid arbitration with the IAAF which, under the New York Convention, we are obligated to recognize. Thus, the issue decided in that arbitration cannot be relitigated. Because adjudication of the state-law claims alleged against the IAAF in Slaney's complaint would necessitate relitigation of the issue decided in the arbitration, the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. Likewise, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Slaney's state-law claims against the USOC, finding that those claims were preempted by Congress's grant of exclusive authority to the USOC to determine the eligibility of American athletes. Finally, the district court correctly determined that Slaney did not state a proper claim against the USOC for violation of the federal RICO statute.

For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the decision of the district court.

/1 The USOC, located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is the National Olympic Committee for the United States. This status dictates that the USOC carry out the mission of the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") and the Olympic Movement in

this country. Because the IOC has promulgated a drug testing program, the USOC administers that program in the United States for all qualifying competitions for the Olympic Games.

/2 Specifically, Slaney's samples tested at ratios of 9.5:1 to 11.6:1.

/3 The IAAF is an unincorporated organization based out of Monaco, which was founded to coordinate and control track and field activities around the world. The IAAF, which has a membership of federations representing over 200 nations and

territories, establishes worldwide rules for track and field competitions which are embodied in the IAAF Constitution and other regulations. Each federation governs track and field competitions within its own territory and has agreed with all other federations to follow IAAF rules in doing so.

/4 In addition to its Olympic duties, the USOC has been designated as the coordinating body for all amateur sports in this nation by the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act ("Amateur Sports Act"), 36 U.S.C. sec. 220501 et seq. Under the

Amateur Sports Act, the USOC is required to select a national governing body for each amateur sport. For track and field, the USATF, an Indianapolis corporation, has been designated as the governing body. As the national governing body, the USATF is subject to the Amateur Sports Act. Furthermore, the USATF is also a member of the IAAF, and is responsible for enforcing the IAAF's rules and regulations.

/5 Because of indications, during the late 1970's, that some national track and field federations were turning blind eyes to their athletes' drug abuse, the IAAF established worldwide testing procedures and eligibility rules. Rules 21-23

require all disputes between the IAAF and members to be submitted to an arbitration panel.

/6 We note that Slaney walks a tightrope throughout this portion of her appellate argument. On the one hand, in order to raise many of the causes of action she alleges, Slaney must establish that there is a contractual relationship between her

and the IAAF. However, in order to maintain the action as a whole against the IAAF, Slaney must avoid any suggestion that she has a contractual relationship with the IAAF whereby she has agreed to abide by their rules, including those which

compel arbitration of all disputes.

/7 The original RICO claim was brought against both the IAAF and the USOC. However, the district court only analyzed the claim as it pertained to the USOC, determining that the Tribunal's decision removed subject matter jurisdiction over

Slaney's claim against the IAAF. On appeal, Slaney has not challenged the dismissal of the RICO claim against the IAAF, but rather only argues that the district court erred in misapplying the law with regard to the RICO claim against the USOC. We do note that by challenging the applicability of the New York Convention as a bar against her claims, Slaney has in fact challenged the foundation upon which the dismissal of her IAAF RICO claim was granted. However, because we determined above that the New York Convention does in fact preclude all of Slaney's claims against the IAAF, we need not

further address the district court's decision regarding the IAAF RICO claim. Thus, as the district court did, we focus our inquiry on Slaney's RICO claim against the USOC.

/8 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962(c) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

/9 Slaney suggests that because the district court focused on the conduct and pattern prongs of the RICO cause of action, that it presumably found the other elements adequately alleged. We disagree. Since a cause of action under 1962(c) requires four distinct elements, once the district court determined that Slaney's complaint did not adequately state a claim for relief because one of those elements was lacking, it was under no obligation to address the remaining elements. In this opinion, we do not address all four elements of a 1962(c) claim. However, by no means do we suggest that our silence on these elements indicates that we find them adequately alleged.

/10 We do not believe that in most cases it is proper for a plaintiff to attempt to satisfy the particularity requirement of 9(b) through an incorporation of the entire complaint into the RICO claim. In this instance, the 104 paragraphs in Slaney's complaint reference numerous mail and wire transactions, most of which were completely innocuous. Though we examined the alleged predicate acts contained in those paragraphs, we note that such a nebulous identification of predicate acts could be grounds enough to find that Slaney had failed to meet the particularity requirement of 9(b).

/11 We also entertain serious doubt as to whether Slaney has sufficiently alleged an enterprise, as required by 1962(c). Slaney's complaint has merely defined the enterprise through the manner in which it operates. But, "[t]his court has

repeatedly stated that RICO plaintiffs cannot establish structure by defining the enterprise through what it supposedly does." Stachon, 229 F.3d at 676. Though a pattern of racketeering activity may be the means by which an enterprise

interacts with society, it is not itself the enterprise, "for an enterprise is defined by what it is, not what it does." Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir. 1990).

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