Yes. The lane rule forced the pace for the whole lap, and effectively in an 800, therefore, the whole race.
Ovett blind on the outside was running what Coleman - and he - thought was quite hard, 51-high pace.... a wise strategy given a. Ovett's youth and b. previous championship history. But look where he was positioned at the break!
The 74CG over which ventolin (rightfully) spooges maximally was also a 300-in-lane race. Classic. The 1977 WC, similarly. Another classic.
There is no doubt at all that the IAAF lane rule as enforced 74-77 achieved these great results but then the IAAF changed it for no good reason. We should still have it in force, that way we'd know who really was king. Can you see Schumann winning the 00 OG with this rule in force?
Watch closer. Every race is a work of art that can only be fully appreciated from its context as well as the actions on the track.
Let's interpret the drama carefully as it unfolds and I will explain why I think Rick handled himself expertly.
1. Respect for the initial pace.
RW knew about the lane rule and its likely effect. He resolved not to capitulate, but also, not to set out maniacally. Put yourself in Rick's shoes that day. This plan requires serious discipline when it's the Olympic final, to which you've dedicated you can't see your opponents. Rick wasn't the only one who kept a cool head, but this was the first tactic.
2. Watch his response to SriRam Singh's surge at the bell. Don't panic, cover Juantorena. With all respect to Singh, RW didn't think he'd be figuring in the homestretch for medals. Keep it on the rail as much as possible.
3. Prepare for a late backstretch surge, or at least, firm maintenance of the very fast pace. This was his original race-winning plan. Remember, prior to this race, RW possessed the best PR in the field (1:44.1y) as well as his 2:13.9WR kilo. He knew his best tactic was to keep it moving hard all the way, even and very fast. Keep it even, ratchet it up at this point and drop the field...
3. He was absolutely ready to make a race-winning strike at 570m.
The only reason he didn't do this was because he couldn't. Juantorena was on pole and running everyone into the ground. But Wohlhuter did NOT PANIC.
At that point in the race, neither Wohlhuter nor Junantorena himself knew whether he could sustain this pace down the homestretch. Wohlhuter was an experienced 800m runner and probably knew they were operating at WR pace. Junatorena was almost a novice, as you remember from his account in the recent wejo IAAF 800m royalty vid.
He maintained cadence in Junatorena's slipstream, waiting for a chance to attack coming off the final turn...when he, reasonably, expected Juantorena to start to fade. It takes a cool head to assess the unexpected, and to hold to the plan under those circumstances deep into the Olympic final.
4. Maintaining form almost to the very end. RW lost to Van Damme in the final few strides. He was utterly blown out by that point and Van Damme's tactics were more conservative than RWs.
Of course IvD also ran very well. His mistake was that he underestimated how much he had left and didn't strike earlier at RW and Juantorena.
5. His final time. I believe RW's 1:44.12 was his fastest official 800m clocking. Yes, I know he ran 1:44.1y, which is clearly better, but his time here was nominally his best 800m effort. It was certainly one of the three or four fastest runs of his career.
You must admit, it was a fantastic race in every respect. Sriram Singh had some real cojones too, not intimidated by that 50.8 first lap - look at his surge around the bottom curve.
I agree that I'm only interpreting Rick's plan in the light of limited knowledge and the context I provide above. It would be fantastic if Rick himself would see this and feel that he might contribute and tell us his reasoning and feelings about this race.
