Racket, PhD wrote:
nonequals wrote:
There is some level of U.S. forces and material aid to the ANSF that could have indefinitely stopped the Taliban from substantially interfering with our CT operations in and from AFG.
How do people not understand after 20 fvcking years of troop activity and money spent that this is obviously not the case. The only options were to leave, or to become a permanent occupying force and turn Afghanistan into a colony.
I'll say it again - what you are seeing unfold is the inevitable result. You could replay the past 20 years and re-spend how ever many trillions of dollars in a near infinite number of different permutations, and every single one of them would lead to this endgame.
You appear to be failing to separate two different things:
1) Our ability to build a self-sustainable Afghan military? We now have the depressingly clear, utterly unambiguous answer: Completely hopeless. We did, indeed, waste essentially ALL efforts and money and associated casualties across 20 years of trying to make them into a functioning military/government.
2) The number of allied forces needed to bolster the ANSF sufficient to keep the Taliban at bay? (And since our only reason to stay there would be counter-terrorism, "at bay" would be defined as, "The Taliban isn't substantively interfering with our CT mission.")
So, to disagree, as you have above, with the simple statement that SOME level of allied troops/money/support could have held back the Taliban indefinitely is nonsensical. OF COURSE there is SOME level (and it's clearly somewhere below the 100K+ we had there for a while). One could have hoped that it was a low 5-figures number. That's what we've had there for almost 10 years, after the draw-down from Obama's surge (my rough recollection is that we went from 100K+, to 60-something, to 30-something, to about 10K, and finally to about 2.5K). And during that time the Taliban obviously still made it very miserable for the ANSF, and did still kill relatively small numbers of allied troops. But it was utterly incapable of impeding our CT mission for most or all of that period.
None of this is an argument that we SHOULD have identified that number AND been willing to provide it. But I am curious what that number might have been.